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Abstract
We augment a RBC model with capital and labor market frictions. We
follow the approach of Wasmer and Weil (2004) which model market im-
perfections as search processes: ¯rms must sequentially ¯nd a match with
a bank ¯rst and then with a worker in order to start production. We show
that the interactions between labor and capital market frictions may gen-
erate a ¯nancial accelerator or decelerator, depending on a parameter
condition. We compare our model with US National Accounts data and
with the empirical ¯ndings of Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005): we ¯nd
that the ¯nancial accelerator as well as real wage rigidities help in im-
proving the statistical properties of the model.
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It is a well recognized fact that the labor market is characterized by imper-
fections: for instance, searching for workers is costly and may take time, just
as searching for jobs is. Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996) or den Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000) nest this type of search frictions µ a la Pissarides (2000) into
a real business cycle (hereafter RBC) model and study their cyclical implica-
tions. There also exist capital market imperfections: several empirical papers
conclude that it is di±cult for some ¯rms to ¯nd capital; in particular Fahrer
and Simon (1994) and Blanch°ower (2004) emphasize that entrepreneurship
and employment creation may be constrained or delayed by lack of immediately
available capital. This points at localization problems in the search for capital
and explores the interaction between the labor markets and the credit markets
imperfections.
Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) apply the methodology of Davis, Haltiwanger,
and Schuh (1996) to bank balance sheet data and show that gross credit °ows
have a much more volatile behavior than net credit °ows; along each cycle it
occurs a massive reallocation of credit, as measured by the di®erence between
the sum of gross °ows (contraction and expansion) and their di®erence. The
standard credit friction models only focus on net positions - see for instance
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) - and cannot easily capture these move-
ments. Matching models could instead be useful to explain stylized facts in the
credit markets since they naturally allow to disentangle gross credit expansion
from credit contraction °ows; modeled respectively as new matches on credit
and destruction of existing matches.
In this paper, we introduce both labor and capital market frictions into a dy-
namic general equilibrium setup and we look at their e®ects on the model sta-
tistical properties. We build on Wasmer and Weil (2004) - hereafter WW - and
introduce double search process to account for credit and labor market imper-
fections. First ¯rms match with banks in the capital market, then they look up
for a worker. Finally production takes place and ¯rms pay back their loans in
the form of an interest rate, which is determined by Nash bargaining.
However, the WW model is a small partial equilibrium one-job-one-¯rm model.
And although the model is dynamic, most of their analysis is conducted at the
steady state equilibrium by the means of comparative static exercises. We in-
stead develop a dynamic general equilibrium model, in the spirit of the RBC
literature, and we provide a developed statistical analysis, by studying the im-
pact of technology shocks on the simulated economy. Moreover, in WW, the
supply of credit comes out of the blue and may be in¯nite. We here close the
model by assuming that credit is provided by households, and is therefore lim-
ited. Finally, in WW, the price of small ¯rm output is exogenous. We here add
large ¯rms to make this price endogenous.
More precisely, in our model economy, we assume there are two types of ¯rms:
2small intermediate producers and large ¯nal producers. The ¯rst type of ¯rms
uses one unit of labor and one unit of capital to produce, and is subject to
an exogenous destruction rate every period. The large type ¯rm buys the in-
termediate products and adds risk-free capital to it as according to a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function. Household investments are divided into two
types: one is safe capital, lent directly to large ¯rms; the second is risky capital
which is lent to small intermediate ¯rm through the intermediation of banks.
Capital frictions apply in the relationship between banks and small ¯rms, while
labor frictions apply to small ¯rms and workers.
Comparing our model with a set-up that only entails labor market frictions, we
¯nd the following results. First, we are able to reproduce, as in an adjustment
cost model, the empirical ¯nding that consumption leads GDP over the cycle1.
Second, frictions entail ampli¯cation of the cycle in the sense of Kocherlakota
(2000): one period after the shock, the level of GDP is more distant from
the steady state than the size of the shock itself; moreover we ¯nd that the
ampli¯cation e®ect is stronger the higher the matching frictions. A technology
shock raises total factor productivity of the large ¯rms and has two self enforcing
e®ects on the economy. The shock raises the value of small ¯rm products,
increasing vacancy openings as in a standard matching model and it stimulates
capital accumulation. An added twist of our model is that positive technology
shocks can also reduce the tightness of the credit sector, fostering a further
acceleration of the real activity: we show that this latter indirect e®ect (¯nancial
accelerator) arises only when the cost of keeping a vacancy open paid by the
small ¯rms are higher than the interest rates on deposits paid by the banks.
This condition generalizes the results of Wasmer and Weil (2004) where ¯nancial
acceleration always arises: since there are no households deposits in their model
the cost for a bank is implicitly set equal to zero and any positive vacancy
opening cost for the small ¯rms does the job. If our condition does not hold
(i.e. if we have very low vacancy costs), then we do not generate a ¯nancial
accelerator but instead a ¯nancial decelerator.
Our last point is to compare simulated gross credit expansion (i.e. new matches
in the credit market every period) moments with the empirical ¯ndings of
Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) regarding gross credit aggregates. We ¯nd
that gross credit expansion volatility is dramatically increased by the introduc-
tion of real wage rigidities and that this helps the model in being more consistent
with the data. The idea of real wage rigidity is also consistent with the recent
debate in the labor literature, see for instance Shimer (2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ¯rst present the model in
section 2 and we give the equilibrium de¯nition in 3. The speci¯cation and
calibration of the model is discussed in 4, while the main results are in section
5, leaving some technicalities to the appendix. In section 6 we compare our
simulated gross °ows with the ¯ndings of Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005).
1We thank Marcello Savioz for this observation.
3Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
There are four types of agents in our economy: large representative ¯rms, small
¯rms, representative banks and representative households. Large ¯rms produce
¯nal goods by the means of intermediate goods and capital; the capital for large
¯rms is directly provided by the households, and the capital for the small ¯rms is
indirectly (through the intermediaries/banks that will bear the risk associated
to the small ¯rms) provided by the households. The ¯nal and intermediate
goods markets and the large ¯rms capital market are perfectly competitive.
We assume that a small ¯rm needs one unit of capital and one worker to be
able to produce one intermediate good. Once the ¯rm has found the capital,
it searches for a worker through an imperfect labor market. Finally, when the
¯rm produces, it pays a rent to the bank (resp. household) for the use of capital
(resp. labor).
We use the Pissarides (2000) representation of the labor market, that consists of
a two sided search market between ¯rms and representative households-workers:
it is di±cult to locate labor supply/demand and it is costly and time consuming
for a ¯rm (resp. a worker) to search for a worker (resp. a ¯rm). Following den
Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004), the ¯nancial
market is modeled in a fully symmetric way, i.e. it consists of a two sided search
market between ¯rms and representative banks or households: it is di±cult to
locate capital supply/demand and it is costly and time consuming for a ¯rm
(resp. a bank) to search for a bank (resp. a ¯rm). In both cases, the frictions
may arise from information problems and geographical distance. Frictions on
both ¯nancial and labor markets are represented by matching functions.
The small ¯rm capital rent is determined as a share of the surplus generated
by the production, and we assume an rigid real wage. The price of the ¯nal
goods is normalized to 1, the price of the intermediate goods adjusts to clear
the intermediate goods market and the interest rate adjusts to clear the capital
market.
2.1 Financial and labor frictions
If Lt is the new capital supply (by the banks) and Et the new capital demand (by
the small ¯rms), we de¯ne the number of new capital matches Ht = H(Lt;Et),
where H is a homogeneous matching function, increasing in its arguments and
satisfying constant returns to scale.
Total active population is normalized to 1 and can be employed (Nt) or un-
employed (Ut = 1 ¡ Nt). If Vt is the new labor demand (by the ¯rms) and
1 ¡ Nt the new excess labor supply (by the households), we de¯ne the number
of new labor matches Mt = M(Vt;1 ¡ Nt), where M is a matching function,
4increasing in its arguments and satisfying constant returns to scale. As a result,
the probability pB
t for a bank to ¯nd a ¯rm and the probability pF
t for a ¯rm to










and the probability qF
t for a ¯rm to ¯nd a worker and the probability qH
t for a










The small ¯rms can be in three di®erent states:
² state 1: ¯rms searching for a bank able to provide one unit of capital (Et
¯rms)
² state 2: ¯rms with the unit of capital searching for one worker (Vt ¯rms)
² state 3: ¯rms with one unit of capital and one worker, producing one
intermediate goods and paying back a capital rent to the bank and a
labor rent (wage) to the household (Nt ¯rms)
It is worth noting that Nt is the employment level and Vt+Nt is the capital level
used by small ¯rms. If we assume that capital and labor matches are destroyed
with the exogenous probability s2, the dynamics between the di®erent states is:
Vt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Vt ¡ M(Vt;1 ¡ Nt) + H(Lt;Et); (3)
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Nt + M(Vt;1 ¡ Nt): (4)
2.2 Representative household
The representative household has an income that can be consumed (Ct), di-
rectly invested (It) into large ¯rms or indirectly (through banks that behave as












under the budget constraint:
Ct + It + Ht = Ntwt + (rt ¡ ±)Kt + (rb
t + s)(Vt + Nt) + ¦F
t + ¦B
t ; (6)
2Shimer (2005) shows on US data that the separation probability is nearly acyclical, par-
ticularly during the last decades. Hall (2005) also emphasizes that for the past 50 years in
the US, the separation rate is nearly constant while the job-¯nding rate shows high volatility
at business cycle.
5and the investment de¯nitions:
It = Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt (7)
Ht = (Vt+1 + Nt+1) ¡ (1 ¡ s)(Vt + Nt): (8)
U is an increasing and concave utility function and ¯ is the household discount
factor. Income includes wages wt (paid by the small ¯rms), interest rt on capital
in large ¯rms and interest rb
t on capital in small ¯rms (paid by the banks).
± is the large ¯rms capital depreciation rate and s is the small ¯rms capital
depreciation rate (equivalent to the job destruction rate). We assume that the
households hold the small ¯rms and the banks, and therefore receive their whole
pro¯ts, respectively ¦F
t from the ¯rms and ¦B
t from the banks. Maximizing (5)





















The representative bank decides the level of investment Lt it wants to supply,
and collects the resulting number of new capital matches Ht from the house-
holds. The bank receives income ½t from the producing ¯rms (Nt ¯rms) but
have to pay interests to households on the whole capital stock (Vt +Nt units of





½tNt ¡ kLt ¡ (rb






under the °ow constraints:
Vt+1 = (1 ¡ s ¡ qF
t )Vt + pB
t Lt; (12)
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Nt + qF
t Vt; (13)
where k is the bank cost of searching for a ¯rm (capital supply cost). Maximiz-
ing (11) with respect to Lt and under the constraints (12) and (13) gives:







































6Since the banks are held by the households, the rate at which future pro¯ts are
discounted is:









As already explained, the small ¯rms can be in 3 states and their asset values
are respectively given by:
W
F;1





































where c is the ¯rm cost of searching for a bank (capital demand cost), ° is
the ¯rm cost of searching for a worker (labor demand cost), ½t is the capital
price paid to the bank, wt is the wage paid to the worker, dt is the price of
the intermediate goods and ~ ¯t is the rate at which future pro¯ts are discounted.
Since the small ¯rms are held by the households, the rate at which future pro¯ts
are discounted is still given by equation (17).
The free entry condition states:
W
F;1
t = 0: (21)
2.5 Large representative ¯rm











where "t is an aggregate productivity shock, F is a production function satis-
fying the usual Inada conditions, Nt is the amount of intermediate goods (or
equivalently the amount of small ¯rms producing, or equivalently the amount
of employed workers), Kt is the capital stock, rt is the capital interest rate paid
to the households, ± is the depreciation rate of capital. Maximizing (22) with








= rt + ±: (24)
72.6 Labor and capital prices
We assume that real wages are ¯xed at their steady state level: this simplify-
ing assumption is consistent with the fact that in real data, wages are mostly
acyclical and have a low volatility, see for instance King and Rebelo (1999) for
a US empirical evidence or Shimer (2004) for simulation results. In appendix 2,
we assume a Nash bargained wage and compare the two economies (exogenous
vs. Nash bargained wage):
wt = ¹ w: (25)
We assume that the capital price ½t is Nash bargained between the bank and


































Given initial conditions on Vt, Nt and Kt, an equilibrium of this economy is a
sequence of prices fPtg1
t=0 = frt;rb
t;dt;wt;½tg1




² given a sequence of prices fPtg1
t=0, fCtg1
t=0 is solution to the household
problem (9)
² given a sequence of prices fPtg1
t=0, fLtg1
t=0 is solution to the bank prob-
lem (14)
² given a sequence of prices fPtg1
t=0, fEt;Vt+1g1
t=0 are solutions to the small
¯rm problem (21) and the accumulation equation (3)
² given a sequence of prices fPtg1
t=0, fNt+1;Kt+1g1
t=0 are solutions to ac-
cumulation equation (4) and the large ¯rm problem (24)
² given a sequence of quantities fQtg1
t=0, fPtg1
t=0 clears the ¯nal goods
market:
Yt = °Vt + kLt + Ct + It + Ht;
the intermediate goods market (23) and satis¯es the parity condition (10)
3We transpose to the ¯nancial market a usual bargaining rule for the labor market.
4Under certain circumstances (too high wages combined with strongly negative shocks),
¯rms and banks could want to destroy the job. It is easy to check ex post that it never happens
(see appendix 3).
8² wages and small ¯rms capital prices are set according to determination
mechanisms (25) and (27)
A resume of the model equations and of the market clearing conditions is given
in appendix 1.
4 Speci¯cation and calibration
We calibrate our model on quarterly data to reproduce some stylized facts for
the US economy. We choose a logarithmic utility function for the household
and we set ¯ equal to 0.99, implying a steady state real interest rate of roughly
4% per year.






The capital share in production (¹) is set to 0.33. The depreciation rate of
capital ± is set to 0.025 and implies a steady state capital-production ratio of 9.










M(Vt;1 ¡ Nt) =
Vt(1 ¡ Nt)
(V m




where (i) the parameter 0 < h < 1 represents the matching e±ciency (or the
inverse of the friction level): if h ! 0 we have Ht = 0 (in¯nite frictions), if
h ! 1 we have Ht = min(Lt;Et) (no frictions) and (ii) di®erently from the
standard Cobb-Douglas formulation, whatever the friction level, we always have
probabilities 0 < pB
t ;pF
t < 15.
Using the de¯nitions of labor market tightness µt = Vt=Ut and and of credit














this allows us to simply rewrite the probabilities:
pB
t = Átf(Át) and pF
t = f(Át); (31)
qF
t = g(µt) and qH
t = µtg(µt): (32)
5We of course have symmetric properties for the matching function M.
9We get g(0) = 1, g(1) = 0 and @g(µt)=@µt < 0. Moreover limm!0 g(µt) = 0,
limm!1 g(µt) = min(1;1=µt) and @g(µt)=@m > 0.
We get limµt!0 µtg(µt) = 0, limµt!1 µtg(µt) = 1 and @µtg(µt)=@µt > 0. More-
over limm!0 µtg(µt) = 0, limm!1 µtg(µt) = min(1;µt) and @µtg(µt)=@m > 0.
We of course have symmetric properties for function f. These de¯nitions and
properties will be used in the next section to illustrates the e®ects of the ¯nancial
frictions.
We assume that the bargaining power ³ between the ¯rm and the bank is 0.5,
hence the total surplus is equally distributed. From monthly estimations by
Hall (2005), we take an average (over the last 55 years) US job destruction
rate of 4%. Drawing from OECD (2004) on ¯rms survival rates, we compute an
implied average destruction rate for ¯rms entering the US market between 3 and
4 percent per quarter: therefore setting an equal destruction rate for jobs and
¯rms not yet producing does not seem to us too much a restrictive assumption.
Finally, for what regards the productivity shock we set an autocorrelation ´ =
0:9 and a standard deviation ¾u = 0:005.
The matching e±ciencies, the capital search costs, the labor search cost and
the wage (h, m, c, k, °, ¹ w) are chosen to reproduce the observed values for 5
variables, and one parameter constraint. We assume an unemployment rate of
5% (1¡N = 0:05), which is approximately the average US unemployment rate
over the last 30 years (see for instance OECD data). By simplicity, we assume
all the endogenous probabilities pF = qF = pB = qH = 0:75: on average, it
takes slightly more than 1 quarter to obtain capital from a bank, to recruit a
worker, to supply capital to a ¯rm and to ¯nd a job6. Finally, we impose the
same cost for searching a bank than for searching a worker, that is ° = c. At our
steady state we obtain that tightness values are normalized as Áss = µss = 1.
All numerical values are reproduced in table 1.
5 Results
We examine the behavior of the model taking the technology shock as the exoge-
nous driving force. We then illustrate numerically and analytically the ¯nancial
accelerator.
6We do not try to match more precise probabilities since few empirical data are available
to estimate the ¯nancial market probabilities but this would not much a®ect our simulation
results.
10Symbol Value Symbol Value
Depreciation and discount rates
± 0.025 ¯ 0.99
Production function
" 1 ¹ 0.33
Matching functions
h 2.53 m 2.53
Capital and labor prices
³ 0.5 ¹ w 1.87
Search costs and job destruction rate
k 0.66 s 0.04
° 0.37 c 0.37
Table 1: Numerical parameter values
5.1 Cyclical properties
We simulate three di®erent models: (i) a basic RBC model µ a la Hansen (1985)
where all markets are perfectly competitive, (ii) a RBC model µ a la Merz (1995)
with frictions on the labor market (model that nests labor market frictions µ a la
Pissarides (2000) into the basic RBC model) and (iii) our model with frictions
on both the ¯nancial and the labor markets, nesting the µ a la Wasmer and
Weil (2004) into the basic RBC model). We use comparable calibrations for all
models and compare results to business cycle characteristics of US data: sources
and methodology are reported in appendix 4.
The simulation results as well as the US stylized facts are summarized in table 2.
The basic RBC model displays some shortcomings when compared to the real
data: (i) most variables are not persistent enough unless we introduce a very
highly autocorrelated productivity shock, and (ii) all the variables are perfectly
contemporaneous, while consumption leads and employment lags output in real
data. Introducing frictions on the labor market only partly solves the prob-
lems: persistence in simulated data increases but still not enough; and although
unemployment is now lagging, consumption is still coincident with output.
Our model further improves the simulated cyclical properties: consumption
leads output, and unemployment and output are more persistent. Creating em-
ployment now ¯rst necessitates to obtain capital from a bank. The employment
creation process is therefore still much slower and that explains why employ-
ment/output has a stronger persistence. It is worth noting that in the two
models with frictions, we impose an exogenous wage. This is justi¯ed by the
fact that in real data, the wage volatility is quite low, as well as the wage-output
correlation (see for instance Andolfatto (1996) or King and Rebelo (1999) for
empirical evidences). Because the wage adjustment is by de¯nition reduced to
zero, we have an overreaction to shocks of the unemployment level (too high
relative standard deviation): the model with a Nash bargained wage and its
11US economy (1970-2004)
st.dv. cross corr. with GDP(t+k)
variables rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
GDP 1.00 0.29 0.88 1.00
consumption 0.80 0.10 0.69 0.85 0.89 0.49
investment 2.84 0.36 0.88 0.95 0.85 0.28
unemployment 7.44 -0.45 -0.90 -0.88 -0.75 -0.13
model without frictions
st.dv. cross corr. with GDP(t+k)
variables rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
GDP 1.00 0.07 0.69 1.00
consumption 0.23 0.45 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.77
investment 3.58 -0.01 0.65 0.99 0.99 0.99
unemployment 15.28 0.05 -0.63 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98
model with labor frictions
st.dv. cross corr. with GDP(t+k)
variables rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
GDP 1.00 0.14 0.86 1.00
consumption 0.28 0.50 0.78 0.83 0.78 0.77
investment 3.50 0.04 0.83 0.99 0.94 0.92
unemployment 10.8 -0.27 -0.97 -0.90 -0.73 -0.69
model with labor and ¯nancial frictions
st.dv. cross corr. with GDP(t+k)
variables rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
GDP 1.00 0.15 0.86 1.00
consumption 0.27 0.45 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.74
investment 3.34 0.07 0.84 0.99 0.59 0.43
unemployment 11.6 -0.32 -0.99 -0.86 -0.59 -0.43
HP ¯ltered quarterly data, with 1600 weight. US stylized facts: sources and methodology in
appendix 3. Simulated data: GDP´ Ct + It + Ht, consumption´ Ct, investment´ It + Ht,
unemployment´ 1 ¡ Nt.
Table 2: Business cycle statistics
12statistical properties are displayed in appendix 2.
5.2 Financial accelerator: numerical evidence
Figure 1 numerically illustrates that endogenous developments in the capital
market act as a ¯nancial accelerator.




































Figure 1: Impulse responses to a positive 0.5% productivity shock













Figure 2: Impulse responses of tightness to a positive 0.5% productivity shock
13A positive shock stimulates labor demand as in the standard Merz-Andolfatto
setting; moreover it also raises capital supply by banks, reducing credit market
tightness, as shown in ¯gure 2. Small ¯rms face now an increase in the proba-
bility of getting matched; this kind of positive externality increases further the
small ¯rms entry rate boosting therefore employment. The increase in labor en-
hances in turn capital productivity by the labor-capital complementarity link;
this raises the persistence of the technological shock. A one standard devia-
tion (0:5%) TFP shock produces an hump shaped response of output and has a
stronger than 0:5% e®ect on output after two periods: this is the ampli¯cation
e®ect on output as de¯ned by Kocherlakota (2000).
In ¯gure 1 we also compare impulse responses in an economy where there are
more frictions on the labor market and in an economy where there are more
frictions on the ¯nancial market7: both amplify the macro shock but it turns
out that frictions on the ¯nancial markets are more important than frictions
on the labor market to amplify the shock. The ¯nancial accelerator can be
represented as the di®erence between the dotted lines and the dashed lines.
5.3 Financial accelerator: analytical evidence
Further investigation about this issue can be undertaken by looking at the equa-
tions describing the steady state (Á¤;µ¤) of the model: we show that the higher
the credit market frictions the stronger the impact of (permanent) productivity
shocks on the steady state. We directly consider a permanent rise in the price of
intermediate goods, d; this is equivalent to considering a permanent productiv-
ity shock since this latter triggers a permanent capital deepening, a rise in the
(K=N)ss ratio to match the equality 1 + rss = 1=¯. This in turn permanently
increases the dss.
As detailed in appendix 5 (proposition 1 and 2), the steady state equilibrium
(Á¤;µ¤) is the solution of the following system of equations8:
k(s + g(µ))
Áf(Á)
+ (s + r) = (1 ¡ ³)
g(µ)
s
((d ¡ w) ¡ (s + r)); (33)
c(s + g(µ))
f(Á)
+ ° = ³
g(µ)
s
((d ¡ w) ¡ (s + r)): (34)
We also show in appendix 5 (proposition 3) under which the solution (Á¤;µ¤) is
uniquely de¯ned.
Equation (33) is the (µ;Á) equilibrium for the bank (bank equation). The left
hand side is the cost for a bank and the right hand side is its expected income.
This curve is upward sloping: if µ is low (loose labor market), the probability
7We decrease in turn the parameters m and h in equation (28) from 2.53 to 2.
8Without loss of generality we assume that ¯ = 1.
14for a ¯rm to match a worker is high and the expected income for the bank is
therefore also high, leading to high supply of capital by the bank (small Á).
Equation (34) represents the (µ;Á) equilibrium for the ¯rm (¯rm equation).
The left hand side is the cost for a ¯rm and the right hand side is the expected
income. This curve is downward sloping: if Á is high, there is only a few banks
and the average time (cost) for a ¯rm to ¯nd a bank is also high, which implies
that a ¯rm needs a loose labor market (low searching costs) to compensate, that
is a low µ.
These two curves are plotted in ¯gure 3. Proposition 4 (see appendix 5) shows
that a positive technology shock will move both the bank curve and the ¯rm
curve to the right. As a result, µ (labor market tightness) unambiguously in-
creases while the e®ect on Á (credit market tightness) is ambiguous.
We now try to further illustrate the ¯nancial accelerator e®ect. We can rewrite
equations (33) and (34) as follows. By isolating g(µ) from (34) and injecting it
into equation (33), we have:
Á = F(d;h); (35)
µ = G(d;m;f(Á)): (36)
A technology shock has two e®ects on µ in (36): a straightforward direct one
(@G=@d > 0) and an indirect one through Á: by the implicit function theorem
it can be shown that @G=@Á < 0. In fact we know that @g(µ)=@µ < 0 and
@f(Á)=@Á < 0. Equation (34) implies that @g(µ)=@d < 0 and @g(µ)=@f(Á) < 0:
the previous inequalities mean that @µ=@d > 0 and @µ=@Á < 0.
The accelerative (resp. decelerating) nature of the indirect e®ect depends on
the fact that credit market tightness drops (resp. rises) due to the technology
shock. This depends on the net cost of providing a vacancy: proposition 5
(appendix 5) shows that credit market tightness drops if the cost of bearing a
vacancy by small ¯rms (°) is higher than the interest rate (r+s) paid by banks.
When this is the case, banks have the incentive to expand the loan variable L
more strongly than small ¯rm entrance rate E. This causes ¯nancial market
tightness Á to drop and ampli¯es (¯nancial accelerator) the e®ect of productivity
shock on unemployment.
The indirect e®ect of d on µ (through the fall in Á) is proportional to the
¯nancial market frictions. With a perfect ¯nancial market, we have h ! 1
and limh!1 f(Á) = 19. The system of equations (35) and (36) are therefore
rewritten as:
Á = F(d); (37)
µ = G(d;m): (38)
9Limit when Á · 1, which is the case when h ! 1.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium labor and ¯nancial markets: a permanent productivity
shock
The indirect e®ect of d on µ disappears and the increase in µ following a positive
productivity shock is less important. The ¯nancial accelerator (decelerator)
plays through the term f(Á), which is null without ¯nancial frictions and is
higher the higher the frictions. With a perfect labor market market, we have
m ! 1 and limm!1 g(µ) = 1=µ10. The system of equations (35) and (36)
remains unchanged and d has still two e®ects on Á. The ¯nancial accelerator
applies even without labor market frictions.
6 Gross credit °ows
Standard credit friction models only take into account net credit °ows; recently
Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) have shown that focusing only on the net
dimension can give a distorted representation of the credit markets. The authors
apply to credit variables the methodology of Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996): considering each bank in the dataset as a single unit they take balance
sheet data and consider the net position of each unit; the sum over all sample
of separate positive and negative signs gives respectively gross credit expansion
and gross credit contractions. The ¯ndings of Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005)
which relate to our paper are the following: gross credit expansion is more
volatile than GDP by a ratio of two; gross credit expansion is procyclical but
has a low contemporaneous correlation with GDP (around 0.35).
In this section we present the comparison between simulated gross credit expan-
10Limit when µ ¸ 1, which is the case when m ! 1.
16sion and the statistics reported by Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005); as a proxy
for credit expansion in the model we take the number of matches in the credit
market each period, h. This latter variable more tightly corresponds to the gross
credit °ow expansion as described in Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005); to our
knowledge no data are instead available for credit market tightness moments.
Data as in Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005)
st.dv. cross corr. of GDP with Cred.Exp.(t+k)
Variable rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
Credit Expansion 2 -0.07 0.37 0.35 0.26 0.16
Nash bargaining wage
st.dv. cross corr. of GDP with Cred.Exp.(t+k)
Variable rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
Credit Expansion 0.02 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.7
Rigid wages
st.dv. cross corr. of GDP with Cred.Exp.(t+k)
Variable rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
Credit Expansion 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.9
Table 3: Credit expansion statistics
The °exible real wage model can hardly capture credit °ows dynamics; volatility
of gross credit expansion is too low by many orders and it is countercyclical. The
¯xed wage version improves on both the volatility dimension and the correlations
; this is quite remarkable since no liquidity or money is explicitly in the model.
Nevertheless we are not able to capture the lagging nature of gross credit °ows
with respect to GDP; while we are not very far from the low contemporaneous
correlation between GDP and gross °ows which are found in the data.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we extend the Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) RBC models
with frictions on the labor market, by adding imperfections on the capital mar-
ket. To do so, rather than to rely on asymmetric information and moral hazard
problems as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), we rely on localization
problems as in Wasmer and Weil (2004) and model the frictions on the capital
market in a fully symmetric way to the frictions on the labor market. This strat-
egy allows us to separate credit expansion and contraction consistently with the
di®erence in gross credit expansion and gross credit contraction found in the
data by Dell'Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005)
Our main results are that (i) the introduction of the imperfect capital market
improves the cyclical properties of the model (ii) the frictions on the ¯nancial
17market act as a ¯nancial accelerator, that is they amplify and propagate the
macroeconomic shocks. (iii) a rigid wage partially helps in reproducing credit
°ows statistics, even if a more complex model (with monetary shocks) are prob-
ably more suitable to match the data.
To keep this simple framework, this model is very stylized and could then be
developed along several dimensions:
² Neither the exogenous wage (no °exibility at all) nor the Nash bargained
wage (too much °exibility) lead to a fully convincing modelization. Mak-
ing a di®erence between outsiders and insiders, or introducing a Calvo
type wage in the search framework could improve our modelization.
² Our credit view is not related to liquidity since money is not introduced
in the model. It should rather be interpreted as propensity to lend. This
model could be extended by adding a monetary dimension with liquidity
and a monetary policy shock.
We leave these extensions for future research.
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M(Vt;1 ¡ Nt) =
Vt(1 ¡ Nt)
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Vt+1 = (1 ¡ s ¡ qF
t )Vt + pB
t Lt; (44)
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Nt + qF
t Vt; (45)
It = Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt; (46)
Ht = (Vt+1 + Nt+1) ¡ (1 ¡ s)(Vt + Nt); (47)






























































































wt = ¹ w: (58)




where ´ is the autoregressive parameter and ut » N(0;¾2
u) and the goods market
clear:
Yt = °Vt + kLt + Ct + It + Ht:
Appendix 2: Nash bargained wage




















































We simulate this model, where » = 0:3 in order to obtain a steady state wage
equal to ¹ w11. Table 4 compares these simulations to our benchmark model
with exogenous wage and to the empirical facts. We see that adding the bar-
gained wage deteriorates our results, by drastically reducing the unemployment
volatility and correlations.
11Comparing to usual estimations (between 0.4 and 0.6) this gives a slightly too low ¯rm
bargaining power. Increasing this bargaining power would however not much a®ect our sim-
ulation results.
22US economy (1970-2004)
st.dv. cross corr. with GDP(t+k)
variables rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
GDP 1.00 0.29 0.88 1.00
consumption 0.80 0.10 0.69 0.85 0.89 0.49
investment 2.84 0.36 0.88 0.95 0.85 0.28
unemployment 7.44 -0.45 -0.90 -0.88 -0.75 -0.13
model with labor and ¯nancial frictions, exogenous wage
st.dv. cross corr. with GDP(t+k)
variables rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
GDP 1.00 0.15 0.86 1.00
consumption 0.27 0.45 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.74
investment 3.34 0.07 0.84 0.99 0.59 0.43
unemployment 11.6 -0.32 -0.99 -0.86 -0.59 -0.43
model with labor and ¯nancial frictions, Nash bargained wage
st.dv. cross corr. with GDP(t+k)
variables rel/GDP k -4 -1 0 1 4
GDP 1.00 0.10 0.72 1.00
consumption 0.29 0.43 0.77 0.86 0.85 0.85
investment 3.21 0.00 0.67 0.99 0.99 0.99
unemployment 0.54 -0.56 -0.69 -0.44 -0.42 -0.42
HP ¯ltered quarterly data, with 1600 weight. US stylized facts: sources and methodology in
appendix 3. Simulated data: GDP´ Ct + It + Ht, consumption´ Ct, investment´ It + Ht,
unemployment´ 1 ¡ Nt.
Table 4: Business cycle statistics
23Appendix 3: Ex post check
A match (job) involves 3 agents: the worker, the ¯rm and the bank. In state
2, a small ¯rm and a bank are matched and the ¯rm is trying to ¯nd a worker.




t = 0 and @W B
t =@Vt > 0, both the ¯rm and the bank
have no incentive to voluntary destroy the match.
In state 3, a small ¯rm and a bank are matched through a ¯nancial market





t + @W B
t =@Nt > 0, both the ¯rm and the bank have no in-
centive to voluntary destroy the match because the surplus to share between
them is positive. The worker has no incentive to destroy the match as long as
@W H
t =@Nt > 0.
To avoid these endogenous job destruction problems, we check ex post that these
4 inequalities are never violated during our simulations.
Appendix 4: Description of the data source and
methodology
US data used in the paper include GDP, Consumption, Investment and Unem-
ployment rate. The ¯rst three series come from the Quarterly National Accounts
database of the OECD, from 1970q1 to 2004q4. All data are transformed into
their logarithm and HP ¯ltered with a 1600 weight.
The last series comes from the OECD Main Economic Indicator database, from
1970m1 to 2004m12. This is a monthly series and we take the three months
average value for the quarter of interest. Unemployment rate data are HP
¯ltered with a 1600 weight.





+ (s + r) = (1 ¡ ³)
g(µ)
s
((d ¡ w) ¡ (s + r));
Plugging equations (16) and (20) into (27), we have
½ = (1 ¡ ³)(d ¡ w) + ³(r + s):
By injecting (14) and (16) into (15), and using the de¯nitions of the probabilities
(expressions (31) and (32)) and ½, we get equation (33).
Proposition 1
Á is increasing on [0;µB] and takes values between [ÁB;1].
Proof
24The increasing part can be shown by the means of the implicit func-
tion theorem on equation (33). From the de¯nitions (30), we know
that @Áf(Á)=@Á > 0 and @g(µ)=@µ < 0. From (33), we can also
show that @Áf(Á)=@g(µ) < 0. From the last 3 inequalities, we can
immediately deduce @Á=@µ > 0. From equation (33) we deduce ÁB:
if µ=0 then g(µ) = 1. If Á ! 1 then Áf(Á) = 1 and we can directly





+ ° = ³
g(µ)
s
((d ¡ w) ¡ (s + r)):
By injecting (18), (20) into (19), and using the de¯nitions of the probabilities
(expressions (31) and (32)) and ½, we get equation (34).
Proposition 2
Á is decreasing on [0;µF] and takes values between [0;ÁB].
Proof
The decreasing part is shown by using the implicit function theo-
rem. From the de¯nitions (30), we know that @f(Á)=@Á < 0 and
@g(µ)=@µ < 0. From (34), we can also show that @f(Á)=@g(µ) < 0.
From the last 3 inequalities, we can immediately deduce @Á=@µ < 0.
The remaining part is proved as follows. We look at equation (34).
If µ=0 then g(µ) = 1 and we can directly deduce ÁF. If Á = 0 then
f(Á) = 1 and we can directly deduce µF.
QED
Existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium
Proposition 3
If 0 < ÁB < ÁF then we have the existence of a unique and well-
de¯ned solution.
Proof
From the two previous propositions.
QED
25Friction levels and shock e®ects
Proposition 4
A positive productivity shock (increase in d) increases the labor
market tightness (increase in µ).
Proof
From the f properties, we have @Áf(Á)=@Á > 0. Using equation (33)
with µ constant, we have @Áf(Á)=@d < 0, that is, given the previous
result: @Á=@d < 0. In other words, a positive productivity shock
moves the bank curve to the right. From the f properties, we also
have @f(Á)=@Á < 0. Using equation (34) with µ constant, we have
@f(Á)=@d < 0, that is, given the previous result: @Á=@d > 0. In
other words, a positive productivity shock moves the ¯rm curve to
the right. If the two curves are moving to the right, this will auto-
matically give a higher µ.
QED
Proposition 5




dd < 0 i® the following condition holds:
° > (s + r):
Proof
When ³ = 1¡³, the left hand sides of the bank (33) and ¯rm (34)
equations can be equalized. After some rearrangements we have
that:
k(s + g(µ)) = ¡Áf(Á)(s + r) + [c(s + g(µ)) + f(Á)°]Á; (63)
Now consider the system of equations (33) and (63). The bank
equation (33) is upward sloping (see proposition above) and it shifts
to the right with a positive technology shock. Equation (63) is in-
dependent on d. So it is su±cient (and necessary) to check that
equation (63) is downward sloping in the space (Á;µ) to ensure that
Áss will be negatively a®ected by a productivity shock. Applying





(¡° + s + r)(f(Á) + Áf0(Á)) ¡ c(s + g(µ)):
(64)
26From (63), we obtain:
(k ¡ cÁ)(s + g(µ)) = ¡Áf(Á)(s + r ¡ °):
By introducing this expression into (64), it is easy to show that:
dÁ=dµ < 0 () s + r ¡ ° < 0:
QED
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